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During the early 198 0s, the communities of Butte and 
Anaconda underwent a deindustrialization process. These 
communities lost a few thousand jobs and several thousand 
people. To counter the deindustrialization process, the 
communities utilized several public-private partnerships. 
This project examines two public-private partnerships and 
addresses the roles of these partnerships in Butte- 
Anaconda's economic development.
To understand the context of economic development, six 
perspectives are discussed. These perspectives are grounded 
in several social science disciplines: economics, 
organization theory, political science, public 
administration, and management.
The public-private partnership between Butte-Montana 
Technology Companies began as a non-profit venture in the 
1980s and evolved into a for-profit venture during the 
1990s. Montana Technology Companies made a transition from 
a fossil energy management company to an environmental 
technology management company. In the process of 
transition, Montana Technology Companies was able to 
maintain the job base of nearly 300 highly skilled employees 
in Butte.
The public-private partnership between Anaconda-Atlantic 
Richfield Company involved the transfer of 2,000 acres of 
Superfund sites to Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. Several 
parties were critical during transfer negotiations. These 
parties included the Environmental Protection Agency 
national and regional representatives, the state of 
Montana's Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, 
Montana's congressional delegation, and the Justice 
Department. The outcome was a national, precedent-setting 
transfer: Anaconda-Deer Lodge County became the owner of
2,000 acres of Superfund property and heir to a Jack 
Nicklaus-designed golf course.
The Butte-Montana Technology Companies partnership and the 
Anaconda-Atlantic Richfield Company partnership illustrate 
the complexities and dynamics of economic development. 
Butte-Anaconda will continue its emphasis on public-private 
partnerships as an economic development strategy because 
these partnerships have contributed significantly to Butte- 
Anaconda 's recovery.
ii
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the thesis project. 
This chapter presents the genesis, evolution, and 
deindustrialization of Butte and Anaconda. The chapter also 
discusses the objective of the thesis project and posits the 
research question and highlights the contents of the 
remaining four chapters.
The Genesis of Butte and Anaconda
"Gold made Butte a camp, silver made it a town, but 
copper made it a city," according to Steve Devitt.  ̂ By the 
time the Civil War had ended in 1865, Silver Bow Creek was 
completely staked out. Journals of that period noted 
Butte's population of twenty men and one woman. By 1870 
Butte's population reached 241, but by 1880 the population 
had reached 3,363.^
The story about "The Rise of King Copper" from 1880 to 
1910 is well documented as is the clash between Marcus Daly 
and William Andrews Clark, Montana's Copper Kings.^ Butte 
miners, largely immigrant workers, began to mine and market 
the "red metal" as new technologies such as the electric 
light and telephone increased the value of copper. In 1884 
the construction of the large Washoe Smelter on Warm Springs 
Creek in Anaconda brought large-scale industry and the 
attention of eastern and foreign investors to Montana.̂
1
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By the 1890s Butte-Anaconda was the greatest metal- 
raining center in the United States. The Anaconda Copper 
Mining Company was the most extensive mining company in the 
world by the mid-1890s.® Michael Malone and Richard Etulain 
observed the following:
Western copper came to command U.S. and world 
markets during the 1890s in the wake of ascendancy over 
the formerly dominant Michigan mines. As the "red 
metal" expanded in usage with the rising electrical and 
telephone industries, first Montana, dominated by the 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, and then Arizona, led 
by Phelps Dodge, boomed as copper provinces.̂
Although Butte-Anaconda had become a copper province by
the 1890s, this ascendancy was not without costs. In the
1870s copper ores in Butte were roasted in open pits that
produced fumes of sulfer and arsenic and smoke so thick that
street lamps burned on city streets at midday. Cows grazing
in nearby areas had their teeth coated with fugitive copper
fallen from the air.® Isaac Edinger, a nearby rancher of
that time, stated:
I used to carry a few of those gold-colored teeth in my 
pocket all the time because no one would believe me, 
and I 'd have to show 'era. When they were shown they 
always wanted to keep the evidence, and I'd have to get 
a new supply every time I went back to the 
slaughterhouse.̂
The Evolution of Butte and Anaconda
During the Modern Montana period, 1920 to 1990, 
Montana's economy underwent several changes. In agriculture
82,000 Montanans were employed in 192 0. By 1988, only 
35,500 were e m p l o y e d . O n e  reason for this employment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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decline was the substitution of technology for labor. Farms 
and ranches became more productive with the use of tractors, 
combines, bailers, and irrigation technology.
The extractive industries such as metal mining also 
underwent several changes during the Modern Montana period. 
Beginning in the 1920s the Anaconda Company, formerly 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company and now the world's largest 
copper producer, began to further vertically diversify. The 
Company purchased control of Connecticut-based American 
Brass Company, the world's greatest producer of brass, a 
copper alloy in 1922. This purchase made the Anaconda 
Company the world's leading copper fabricator. Then 
Anaconda developed a fabricating subsidiary, the Anaconda 
Wire and Cable Company, with plants in Great Falls and 
outside the state.
In 1923 the Anaconda Company paid $77 million for the 
Chuquicamata mine in the Andes Mountains of Chile. This 
mine and other Latin America mines produced two-thirds of 
Anaconda's primary copper and three-fourth's of its 
e a r n i n g s . D u r i n g  the mid-l920s two of Anaconda's 
companies, Andes Copper and Chuquicamata, dominated the 
Chilean copper i n d u s t r y . I n  1928 Anaconda purchased the 
remaining properties of the late W.A. Clark and in 1929 it 
completed the acquisition of the Green Cananea Copper 
Company in northern Mexico.
Whenever political discontent toward the Anaconda
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Company arose during the 1930s and 1940s, rumors would 
circulate that the Company was planning to withdraw from 
Butte-Anaconda. However, these rumors subsided when the 
"Greater Butte Project" was announced in 1947. This Project 
was aimed at extracting low-grade ores by using a process of 
underground blasting called block-caving. This new process 
was not cost effective and was replaced with open-pit mining 
in the early 1 9 5 0 s . I n  the 1950s open-pit mining replaced 
undergound mining. Technology also became a substitute for 
labor: Trucks and cranes replaced hardrock miners. In 1955 
the Anaconda Company made its only new commitment to the 
state since World War II with its aluminum operation at 
Columbia Falls and Great Falls.
During the 1960s the Anaconda Company's influence began 
to decline from its zenith. The Company sold its 
newspapers. Moreover, it began to disassociate with the 
Montana Power C o m p a n y . A c c o r d i n g  to Michael Malone, 
Richard Roeder, and William Lang, "[b]y the late 1960s, 
Anaconda bore little resemblence to the fiery dragon it had 
once been.
The Anaconda Company's decline was enhanced by Latin 
American politics. The Company's Chilean assets were seized 
and nationalized by the government in 1 9 7 1 . Felipe 
Larrain and Patricio MeHer observed that "[t]he most 
important problem that the government encountered as a 
result of the copper nationalization was not inside Chile.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Rather, it was related to the issue of compensating the 
previous foreign owners, that is, the U.S. companies 
Anaconda and Kennecott. The Anaconda Company declared a 
net loss of nearly $3 58 million because of the 
nationalization.^^ The loss of Chilean assets forced the 
company to rely heavily on its domestic mines in Montana, 
Arizona, and Nevada. In 1972 the Anaconda Company sold its 
lumber operation, including 670,500 acres of Montana 
forestland, to Champion International for $117 million. 
Malone and Etulain described the decline of metal mining in 
the West in these terms:
Western copper-based mining crumbled during 
the 197 0s and then crashed in the 1980s. A flood of 
cheap copper imports from South America and Africa, 
high labor costs, toughening environmental protection 
laws, and the loss of their communication markets to 
satellites and fiber-optic wire combined to undercut 
the region's miners. The coup de grace came during the 
1970s when booming oil-energy conglomerates set out to 
buy up the devalued western metal companies. Sohio 
acquired Kennecott, Arco got Anaconda, Gulf Resources 
and Chemical bought Idaho's Bunker Hill works, and so 
forth. The oilmen dreamed of new riches in integrated 
resource conglomerates, but by the 1980s they faced 
only tightening markets and big losses. So in the 
early 1980s came the great unloading.
The Deindustrialization of Butte and Anaconda
Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison define 
deindustrialization as "a widespread, systematic 
disinvestment in the nation's basic productive capacity. 
During the 1970s they estimate that "between 450,000 and
650,000 jobs in the private sector, in both manufacturing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and non-manufacturing, were wiped out somewhere in the 
United States by the movement of both large and small 
runaway s h o p s . B l u e s t o n e  and Harrison also estimate that 
"[w]hen the employment lost as a direct result of plant, 
store, and office shutdowns during the 1970s is added to the 
job loss associated with runaway shops, it appears that more 
than 32 million jobs were destroyed.
A similiar deindustrialization process occurred in the 
Butte-Anconda area during the 197 0s. Between December 1974 
and February 1975 the Anaconda Company announced the 
termination of one-third of its Montana workforce, nearly 
2,200 employees. The Company began phasing out the last of 
the undergound mines, the old ore concentrator and foundry 
at Anaconda, and the recently begun Continental-East open- 
pit mine at Butte.
In 1977 Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), a California- 
based multinational, bought The Anaconda Copper Company, 
which became ARCO's Anaconda Minerals Division. Many 
Montanans welcomed the move because they thought ARCO would 
recapitalize the outdated technology of its new Minerals 
Division. However, on the supply-side Latin America and 
South African producers flooded the market and on the 
demand-side new communication technologies such satellites 
and fiber optics required no copper. These dramatic events 
caused ARCO to continue what The Anaconda Copper Company had 
b e g u n . I n  1980 ARCO closed down and dismantled the old
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Anaconda Washoe smelter. In 1983 ARCO terminated all its 
mining operation at Butte and fired the last 700 employees 
there. The result: the population of Butte and Anaconda 
fell from 50,600 in 1980 to 43,200.^^
Objective of Thesis
The objective of this project is to identify the roles 
of public-private partnerships in Butte-Anaconda's economic 
recovery. In 1980 Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) 
announced the closure of Anaconda's smelter and Butte's 
mine. The economic impact was devastating. Nearly 8 0 
percent of the entire annual payroll of Anaconda's 12,000 
people would be e l i m i n a t e d . I n  Butte the final round of 
mine layoffs in 1983 prompted NBC news analyst Tom Brokaw to 
comment that the town was dead.
Two public-private partnerships have assisted in Butte- 
Anaconda 's economic recovery. In the first partnership, 
Butte has benefitted from the expanded role of Montana 
Technology Companies (MTC). MTC has evolved from a 
Department of Energy (DOE) project manager for generating 
electricity from fossil fuel to a project manager for 
commercializing environmental technology. DOE has recently 
designated MTC to manage its Western Environmental 
Technology Office.
In the second partnership. Anaconda has benefitted from 
ARCO's innovative solution. On a Superfund site ARCO will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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build a golf course and transfer title to Anaconda. Instead 
of merely restoring a Superfund site to its original 
condition, ARCO will add value to the site by constructing 
an asset that should generate resources for the community. 
Thus, this project will address the following research 
question: What roles have public-private partnerships played 
in Butte-Anaconda*s economic development?
Overview of Thesis
Chapter 1, Introduction, offers an historical sketch of 
the beginning, evolution, and decline of the Butte-Anaconda 
area from 1865 to 1985. Chapter 2, The Theory Of Public- 
Private Partnerships, will review different partnership 
models. Several disciplines such as public administration, 
economic development, and organization theory provide the 
foundations for these models. Chapter 3, The Butte-Montana 
Technology Companies Partnership, will describe key 
community and corporate players responsible for creating a 
regional environmental technology center. The key players 
include the U.S. Department of Energy, Montana's 
Congressional delegation, and Montana Technology Companies. 
Chapter 4, The Anaconda-Atlantic Richfield Company 
Partnership, will describe key community and corporate 
players responsible for creating the first Superfund golf 
course. The key players include the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the U.S. Justice Department, the Montana
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Health and Sciences Department, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 
and Atlantic Richfield Company. Chapter 5, Conclusion, will 
assess the observations, limitations, and conclusions of 
this project. The chapter will also discuss the 
implications of public-private partnerships for economic 
development.
Finally, for the purpose of this thesis, "Butte" refers 
to the Butte community at large. It does not denote any 
particular public or private organization in Butte. 
"Anaconda" refers to the Anaconda community at large. 
However, the actual (legal) partnership occurs between 
Anaconda-Deer Lodge County and ARCO, although the 
partnership will affect the broader Anaconda community.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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II. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
This chapter identifies six perspectives from which to 
view public-private partnerships. Economics provides the 
basis for the market failure perspective. Organization 
theory and political science provide the bases for the Perry 
and Rainey perspective. Economics and public administration 
provide the bases for both the Savas perspective and the 
Osborne and Gaebler perspective. Economics and management 
provide the bases for the technopolis perspective. Finally, 
management provides the basis for the Waddock perspective.
Oliver Williamson observes that "[c]omplex systems are 
usually studied from several points of v i e w . I n  part, 
Williamson's observation is a guide for selection of the six 
perspectives. Moreover, identification of these six 
perspectives does not imply that this chapter offers a 
comprehensive or exhaustive review of public-private 
partnerships. Finally, the word "perspective" is 
intentionally selected for two reasons. First, a 
perspective provides a way to view and sort complex 
information. Second, a perspective suggests that it is one 
way to view or sort information, but it is not the only way 
to view or sort information.
The Market Failure Perspective
Political theorists employ "the state of nature" as a
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
theoretical construct for explaining the genesis of
government.̂  similiarly, economic theorists employ "the
general equilibrium" as a theoretical construct for
explaining the role of government. In the context of
allocation, Francis Bator defines market failure as "the
failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market
institutions to sustain 'desirable* activities or to stop
'undesirable* activities.This idealized system is
general equilibrium, or perfect competition in the long-run.
Under equilibirum conditions of perfectly competitive
markets such as homogeneous products, no barriers to entry,
and a large number of competitors, an ideal condition of
efficiency is achieved.^ James Gwartney and Richard Stroup
offer this description of the Pareto-optimum solution;
Each good is produced as long as consumers value it 
more than the alternative goods that might be produced 
with the same resources. Conversely, no unit of the 
good is produced if a more valuable alternative must be 
forgone. Therefore, no allocation of resources toward 
production of different goods— could benefit any one 
person without simultaneously hurting someone else.^
Economists describe this ideal condition of allocative
efficiency as Pareto-optimum.® That is, once this condition
is achieved, it is impossible to make anyone better off
without making someone else worse off.̂
Economists generally identify two sources of market
failure: (1) externalities, and (2) increasing returns.®
Externalities arise when a non-consenting, second party is
helped or hurt. Positive externalities such as a lighthouse
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for ships benefit others; negative externalities such as 
pollution make others worse off.̂  Increasing returns arise 
under three conditions: production economies, transaction 
costs, and imperfect information. Production economies of 
scale occur when an increase in production volume leads to a 
decrease in average, per unit cost. Transactions costs 
create obstacles to exchanges such as the costs of finding 
parties with whom to trade and the costs of enforcing 
agreements. Imperfect information implies that consumers 
lack complete or accurate information about a product.
These three conditions create entry barriers to markets, 
which limit the number of competitors and result in "above 
average" industry returns.
In sum, the presumption is that market failures give 
rise to governments. Governments offer remedies for 
externalities and increasing returns. Stated differently, 
public organizations help private organizations overcome 
their shortcomings.
The Perrv and Rainev Perspective
Perry and Rainey found the contemporary literature on 
the public-private distinction to be inadequate. As such, 
they devised a typology that was more comprehesive than 
previous typologies. As Table 2.1 illustrates, 
organizations may be classified based on ownership, funding, 
or mode of social control.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
TABLE 2.1* 
TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Ownership Funding
Mode of 
Social Control Description
1. Public Public Polyarchy Bureau
2. Public Private Polyarchy Government
Corporation
3. Public Public Market Government
Enterprise
4. Public Private Market State-Owned
Enterprise
5. Private Public Polyarchy Government-Sponsored
Enterprise
6. Private Private Polyarchy Regulated Enterprise
7. Private Public Market Government
Contractor
8. Private Private Market Market
*Adapted from Perry and Rainey (1988), p. 196.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The first category is a bureau such as the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The second category is a government
corporation such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. The third category is a government enterprise
such as Amtrak. The fourth category is a state-owned
enterprise such as Airbus. The fifth category is a
government-sponsored enterprise such as the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting. The sixth category is a regulated
enterprise such as Montana Power Company. The seventh
category is a government contractor such as Boeing.
Finally, the eighth category is a market such as IBM.
Although previous typologies made a distinction between
ownership patterns such as taxpayer versus stockholder and
between funding sources such as public revenue or private
sales, these typologies never incorporated the mode of
social control, or structural c o n t e x t s . P e rr y  and Rainey
define the three ideal-typical forms of structural context:
In a market context, organizations must react to the 
choices of numerous buyers and sellers who have no 
organized intent to control the organization. In a 
hierarchical context, a central government directs the 
allocation of resources and enforces rules and 
procedures concerning the production of goods and 
services. In a polyarchic context, there is the 
bargaining and persuasion of groups of external 
organizations and individuals, who have some degree of 
control of the target organization.^^
In short, the mode of social control is the extent to which
an organization's domain is controlled by polyarchy or
markets. Domain elements include rules for establishment
and termination, goods and services, geographical sphere of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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operations, clients, and major technologies. Moreover, the 
mode of social control is a continuum of structures and 
processes, not a dichotomy.
The Savas Perspective
In his study of the intrinsic characteristics of goods 
and services, Savas identifies two important properties or 
dimensions for classifying goods (or services): exclusion or 
consumption. If a supplier can readily deny the acquisition 
or use of the good, then the good has the characteristic of 
exclusion. For example, a suit of clothes has this 
property; a fish in the ocean does not. If a good can be 
consumed individually, then it is an individual-consumption 
good such as eating a loaf of bread. If a good can be 
consumed jointly and simultaneously by many users, then it 
is a joint-consumption good such as viewing a television 
broadcast.
The degree to which goods and services possess these 
two properties results in four idealized types: private 
goods, toll goods, common-pool goods, and collective goods. 
Private goods are characterized by exclusion and individual 
consumption. Toll goods are characterized by exclusion and 
joint consumption. Common-pool goods are characterized by 
nonexclusion and individual consumption. Collective goods 
are characterized by nonexclusion and joint consumption.
An example of a private good is a fish in a creel;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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however, a fish in the ocean is a common-pool good. An 
example of a toll good is a national park; national defense 
is a collective good. Toll goods, common-pool goods, and 
collective goods are frequently referred to as "public 
goods." Thus, it is the nature of the good or service that 
determines whether public or private organizations should 
provide the good or service.
Savas separates the provision of goods and services 
into three functional areas: ownership, management, and 
operations. Savas divides these three functional areas 
between public and private organizations in eight different 
categories. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the eight 
categories.
The first category is a typical public system or 
government-owned enterprise such as the U.S. Postal Service. 
The second category is a management contract such as hiring 
a private firm to manage a public bus system where buses are 
publicly owned and workers are public employees. The third 
category is a management and operations contract such as a 
private firm to run a country hospital. The fourth category 
is an operations contract such as manpower leasing or hiring 
temporary clerical staff. The fifth category is equipment 
and facility leasing such as a public agency renting a 
building. The sixth category is a typical private system 
such as IBM. The seventh category is a government takeover 
such as nationalizing the steel industry in an emergency.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 2.2*
FUNCTIONAL DIVISION OF SERVICE ACTIVITIES
Function Description
Ownership Management Operation
1. Public Public Public Typical public 
system or 
state-owned 
enterprise
2. Public Private Public Management contract
3. Public Private Private Management and 
operations contract
4. Public Public Private Operations contract
5. Private Public Public Equipment and 
facility leasing
6. Private Private Private Typical private 
system
7. Private Public Private Government takeover
8. Private Private Public Government-pa id 
workers assigned to 
a private firm
*Adapted from Savas (1987), p. 87.
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Finally, the eighth category is government-paid workers 
assigned to a private firm such as an employment training 
program.
The Osborne and Gaebler Perspective
Using Savas' analytical framework as a baseline,
Osborne and Gaebler introduce another organizational 
category: the third sector. The third sector is non-profit 
organizations such as religious organizations, community 
groups, and professional associations. As such, Osborne and 
Gaebler identify which sector —  public, private, or third 
—  is most effective at a given task. Table 2.3 summarizes 
their assessment.
The public sector is most effective at tasks such as 
regulation and enforcement of equity, among others. The 
private sector is most effective at tasks such as investment 
and profit generation, among others. And the third sector 
is most effective at tasks such as volunteer labor and 
promotion of community, among others.
The Smilor. Gibson, and Kozmetsky Perspective
Smilor, Gibson, and Kozmetsky's perspective is 
primarily empirically based. They derive their framework, 
the technopolis, from studying the dynamics of high- 
technology development and growth in Austin, Texas during 
the 1980s. The term "technopolis" reflects an emphasis on
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TABLE 2.3*
TASKS BEST SUITED TO EACH SECTOR
(E = effective, I = ineffective. D = depends on context)
Public Private Third
Best Suited to Public Sector
Policy management E I D
Regulation E I D
Enforcement of equity E I E
Prevention of discrimination E D D
Prevention of exploitation E I E
Promotion of social cohesion E I E
Best Suited to Private Sector
Economic tasks I E D
Investment tasks I E D
Profit generation I E I
Promotion of self-sufficiency I E D
Best Suited to Third Sector
Social tasks D I E
Volunteer labor tasks D I E
Minimal profit tasks D I E
Promotion of community D I E
Commitment to others' welfare D I E
*Adapted from Osborne and Gaebler (1992), p. 348.
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technology and the balance between public and private 
sectors.^® They note that "[n]ew relationships between 
public and private sectors —  especially among business, 
government, and academia —  are having far reaching 
consequences on the way we think about and take action on 
economic development.
Table 2.4 summarizes the technopolis, which consists of 
seven major partners: the research university, large 
technology companies, small technology companies, federal 
government, state government, local government, and support 
groups.^® Smilor, Gibson, and Kozmetsky emphasize that key 
individuals, or influencers, are critical to linking the 
seven partners.
The Waddock Perspective
Based on an empirical study of five public-private 
partnerships in the Boston, Massachusetts area, Waddock 
identifies six linking mechanisms. Table 2.5 describes 
these six mechanisms. Mandates involve legislation which 
requires interaction between the public and private sectors. 
Networks involve connections between individuals or groups 
who generally work for unrelated organizations. Brokers are 
third party individuals or groups who bring together or 
maintain relationships. Common visions are shared goals 
which motivate people to work together. Crises are also 
shared goals which motivate people. Visionary leadership
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TABLE 2.4*
THE TECHNOPOLIS PARTNERS
University
Engineering 
Business 
Natural science 
Research centers 
Other
Large corporations
Fortune 500 Headquarter branches
Major research & development and/or sales
Major employer
Emerging Companies
University spin-off 
Large company spin-off 
New ventures
Federal Government
Sponsored research 
Defense spending
State Government
Education support 
Programs
Local Government
Infrastructure 
Competitive rates 
Quality of life
Support Groups
Community
Chamber
Business
* Adapted from Smilor, Gibon, and Kozmetsky (1989), p. 51.
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TABLE 2.5*
THE LINKING MECHANISMS
Linking Mechanism Description
Mandates Legislation requiring interaction 
between public and private sectors.
Networks Existing relations among individuals who 
work for otherwise unrelated 
organizations. Types include personal- 
social, business-professional, 
political, and community-civic.
Brokers Organizations that attempt to bring or 
keep otherwise unrelated organizations 
working together toward some common goal 
through structuring meetings, providing 
funding, or other activities.
Common Vision A shared sense of the commonality, 
common purpose, or common problems faced 
within or by a region or group of 
organizations.
Crisis A very difficult issue, concern, or 
problem around which much attention is 
focused so that it can be resolved.
Visionary
Leadership
The leadership of a forward thinking 
individual who through personal or other 
characteristics is able to draw the 
attention of others to issues in which 
the leader is interested.
*Adapted from Waddock (1986), p. 279.
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involves an individual who rallies others toward support of 
the vision.
As the descriptions indicate, the categories are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, a public-private 
partnership may exist because of a mandated network. That 
is, public-private organizations form a partnership owing to 
the mandated aspect, but the partnership necessitates the 
assistance of other, unrelated public or private 
organizations to implement the mandate. Moreover, one 
group's vision may be another group's crisis. For example, 
regarding the results of the 1994 General Election, the 
Democratic Pary interprets the outcome as a crisis. In 
sharp contrast, the Republican Party interprets the outcome 
as Americans embracing its common vision or "Contract With 
America," an aggressive legislative agenda for the first 100 
days in 1995. Part of this common vision arose from the 
"visionary leadership" of Newt Gingrich, the new Speaker of 
the House. Newt Gingrich, who describes himself as a 
"futurist conservative," integrates Thomas Jefferson's view 
of government, Arthur Laffer's view of economics, and Alvin 
Toff1er's view of the information society. In short,
Waddock observes that "[t]hese linking mechanisms, singly or 
in combination, provide a rich set of interorganizational 
linkages that can facililitate partnership if they are 
present or hinder its development if they are lacking.
Waddock notes that public-private partnerships are a
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function of the presence or absence of the linking 
mechanisms in their environments. Thus, Waddock argues for 
an "environmental analysis" to determine whether a 
partnership is feasible. Partnership feasibility improves 
under three conditions; (1) specific issues, (2) mutual 
benefits, and (3) true interdependency.^^
Summary
This chapter provided six perspectives from which to 
view public-private partnerships. The market failure 
perspective views the public sector as a remedy for the 
private sector's shortcomings. These shortcomings or 
failures arise from two sources: externalities and 
increasing returns. The Perry and Rainey perspective 
distinguishes public organizations from private 
organizations. This perspective classifies organizations 
based on ownership, funding, and mode of social control.
The Savas perspective develops another classification scheme 
for public and private organizations. This perspective uses 
the inherent characteristics of goods and services to 
determine whether public or private organizations are the 
best suppliers. This perspective classifies public and 
private organizations based on ownership, management, and 
operation.
The Osborne and Gaebler perspective builds on the work 
of the Savas perspective. Osborne and Gaebler assign
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
various tasks to three sectors; public, private, and third. 
The tasks are "weighted” based on their degree of 
effectiveness. The Smilor, Gibson, and Kozmetsky 
perspective identifies eight partners for creating a 
"technopolis." Their perspective derives from observations 
of the emerging technopolis of Austin, Texas. Finally, the 
Waddock perspective provides insight to creating public- 
private partnerships. This perspective describes the 
various linking mechanisms necessary for initiating and 
maintaining partnerships.
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III. The BUTTE-MONTANA TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES PARTNERSHIP
This chapter reviews the public-private partnership 
between Butte and Montana Technology Companies (MTC). 
Although MTC has a parent organization, Montana Energy 
Research and Development Institute (MERDI), this chapter 
focuses on MTC and its subsidiaries since MTC is the for- 
profit arm of the Montana Energy Research and Development 
Institute. This chapter examines the evolution of Montana 
Technology Companies in the context of dramatic changes 
during 1993 and 1994.
Montana Energy Research and Development Institute
The Montana Energy Research and Development Institute 
(MERDI) was formed in 1974 by a group of Montanans led by 
then-U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield. MERDI had three 
objectives: to create high technology jobs, to contribute to 
civic and community jobs, and to support education. From 
1976 to 1980 MERDI operated the Component Development and 
Integration Facility (CDIF) for the U.S. Department of 
Energy.̂  In 1980 MERDI founded Mountain States Energy (MSB) 
to administer, manage, and develop its for-profit 
activities.^
Until April 1989 MERDI wholly owned two for-profit 
subsidiaries: The Center for Innovation and Mountain States 
Energy. In April 1989 MERDI created a new wholly owned
30
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subsidiary, Montana Technology Companies (MTC). MERDI 
transferred The Center for Innovation's and Mountain States 
Energy's stock to Montana Technology Companies (MTC) in 
exchange for 100 percent of the outstanding stock of MTC.^
In sum, the Montana Energy Research and Development 
Institute (MERDI) now owns Montana Technology Companies 
(MTC). MTC now owns three subsidiaries: Mountain States 
Energy (MSE), The Center for Innovation (CFI), and Western 
Environmental Services and Technologies (WEST). However,
CFI and WEST are currently inactive and neither provide 
services nor produce revenues.^
Component Development and Integration Facilitv
The Component Development and Integration Facility 
(CDIF) was built in 1977 on a 53-acre site and is owned by 
the U.S. Department of Energy. During 1980 Mountain States 
Energy (MSE) assumed MERDI's contract and has since managed 
the CDIF site and the Magnetohydrodynamics Program until 
termination of the project on September 30, 1993.  ̂ The 
objective of Magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) was to develop 
cleaner energy output from various raw material inputs. MHD 
uses magnets to improve coal's generating ability while 
burning it cleanly at the same time.® MHD has the potential 
to double energy output of conventional generating 
facilities with no increase in fuel consumption or air 
pollutants. The MHD process would reduce particle emissions
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by about 90 percent, and sulfer dioxide emissions by 99 
percent.^
During the 1980s the MHD Program achieved several 
research and development milestones. In April 1981, MHD 
electrical power was first generated using an oil-fire 
combustor. One year later electric power was successfully 
inverted and supplied to the local power grid. The 
Westinghouse-designed inverter, which converts the generated 
electricity from direct current to alternating current, was 
provided to CDIF by the Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI), a non-profit consortium of more than 630 electric 
utility companies.®
In September 1984 coal-fired combustor testing was 
initiated and electric power was produced and transmitted 
through the inverter the following year. During 1992 coal- 
fired combustor testing was completed, prototypic hardware 
was installed, and electric power was generated. During 
1993 other technical accomplishments were achieved such as 
700 hours of electrical and thermal testing.®
Since the MHD Project had demonstrated "proof-of- 
concept," the Project was ready to move from the lab to the 
field, where the technology would be test marketed. The 
proposed $650 million Billings MHD Demonstration Project 
would test the commercial viability of MHD during the fifth 
round of the Department of Energy's Clean Coal Technology 
Demonstration p r o g r a m . T h e  test market selected was
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Montana Power Company's J.E. Corette plant in Billings since 
the project was developed both by MTC and MPC. The 
Department of Energy would partially fund the refitting of 
MPC's plant.However, during May 1993 the Department of 
Energy decided against naming MHD technology a recipient of 
a Clean Coal V award, which killed the hopes of transferring 
the technology to MPC's coal-fired, electrical generating 
plant in Billings.
Montana Technoloov Companies' Diversification
Beginning in the 1990s, Montana Technology Companies 
began to diversify. The Department of Energy was funding 
MHD research at $40 million in fiscal 1991 and fiscal 1992. 
MTC's share would be approximately $12 million to $15 
million each year. But the Department of Energy budgeted 
MHD funds of only $30 million for fiscal 1993 and no funds 
during fiscal 1994.^^ Consequently, MTC began to locate 
other sources of revenue.
In August 1990 Senators Max Baucus and Conrad Burns 
introduced legislation that would allocate $3.5 million in 
fiscal 1991 toward creation of a mining waste technology 
center. The Baucus-Burns bill would make the Environmental 
Protection Agency the primary funding s o u r c e . A s  Senator 
Baucus stated, "[t]here's no place in the country better 
suited, with better qualified people and companies, than 
Butte.
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The Baucus-Burns bill became law and established the 
National Mine Waste Technology Center. The Center had 
several objectives: (1) to develop, test, and certify 
innovative technologies which can be used to remove, 
recover, and decontaminate mine wastes, (2) to train and 
educate mine waste personnel and managers on the use of 
innovative technologies, (3) to promote the transfer of 
mining and industrial waste technologies between and among 
government agencies, as well as private industry, and (4) to 
establish a national mine waste data base and serve as a 
clearinghouse for information on existing and developing 
technologies.
In August 1991 MTC participated in the first National 
Mine Waste Technology Conference sponsored by the Department 
of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency's National 
Mine Waste Technology Center. EPA distributed funds to the 
Center which would be located at DOE's CDIF site.
Although the federal government had pledged $3.5 million 
annually and the state $300,000, this nearly $4 million 
would be less than one-third of the annual budget MTC had 
received for the MHD Program.^®
Beginning in April 1993, Montana Technology Companies 
faced a potential budget crisis since 60 percent of MSE's 
$25 million budget came from the MHD Program. The 
Department of Energy budgeted $2 million for the CDIF site 
in fiscal 1994, far below its $15 million budget for fiscal
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1993. The funds were targeted for shutting down the MHD 
program at the CDIF site. As of April 1993, DOE had 
invested more than $750 million nationally in MHD 
technology.^® According to Don Peoples, MTC's CEO, "[t]he 
most serious ramification of this whole thing is the loss of 
technical ability we've developed at the CDIF."^°
On May 5, 1993, the Department of Energy passed over 
the Billings MHD Demonstration Project. The DOE also 
proposed closing down the CDIF facility in Butte where MHD 
testing had taken place since 1977. In a letter to DOE 
Secretary O'Leary, Senator Burns expressed disappointment 
that none of the five projects funded during Clean Coal V 
were from western states. The five states selected were 
Kentucky, Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
During 1992 Montana's congressional delegation was able 
to secure a new funding source. The National Environmental 
Waste Technology and Testing Center (NEWTTEC) was created to 
investigate methods for mining, energy, defense, industrial 
and other wastes. Federal participants include these 
agencies: EPA, Agriculture, Energy, Interior, and Defense. 
The Department of Defense promised to fund the National 
Environmental Waste Technology and Testing Center. However, 
by April 4, 1993 the Department of Defense had not released 
the $10 million promised for N E W T T E C . G i v e n  the May 5 
announcement that the DOE had proposed to close the CDIF 
site, MTC would face a substantial reduction in revenue of
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$25 million. On May 28 Lee Aspin, Secretary of Defense, 
announced that DOD would spend $10 million on NEWTTEC which 
had been promised in 1992. As Don Peoples noted, ”[w]e've 
still got a $15-million gap that we've got to make up.
To make up the budget shortfall, MTC considered other 
uses such as air and space research for the CDIF site. The 
MHD Program had produced knowledge and technology that were 
directly applicable to air and space research. The high- 
temperature methods used on coal and waste projects have 
direct applications to ceramic plane and spaceshift 
components, which must withstand great pressure.
One possible revenue source was NASA. NASA has been 
charged with helping the U.S. airline industry compete with 
the European consortium funding of Airbus. Consequently, 
NASA is working with Boeing, GE Aircraft Engines, McDonnel 
Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney to develop the "High Speed 
Civil Transport" by 2001.^®
Senator Burns, the ranking Republican member of the 
Senate Science, Technology, and Space Subcommittee, arranged 
for NASA chief, Dan Goldin, to visit Butte in August 1993. 
According to Senator Burns, "[a] decision by NASA to do 
high-speed civic transport and space plane research at the 
MHD facility would permit the facility to keep its 
scientists and engineers fully employed in light of the 
Department of Energy’s decision to end MHD clean coal 
research."^® Dan Goldin toured the CDIF site along with
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Senator Burns in August. Following the tour Goldin stated 
that "there are some possiblities. . . . Goldin noted that 
NASA is aware that the public wants to see less government 
spending. As such, NASA was looking to conduct research at 
existing facilities to keep costs down.^°
MTC would eventually receive a $1.5 million contract 
for fiscal 1995 related to NASA's interests. The funding 
would come from the Veterans Afairs, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill. 
The $1.5 million contract was for a hypersonic wind tunnel. 
The tunnel is the basic technology for testing and obtaining 
technical and design information for hypersonic and 
supersonic aircraft.
Since NASA resources were more long-term than 
immediate, MTC continued to look elsewhere. In September 
Montana's congressional delegation was seeking $11 million 
from the Department of Defense 1994 appropriation's bill to 
fund two current projects at the CDIF site. The two 
projects were spray casting technology and the plasma 
furnace centrifugal p r o g r a m . T h e  spray casting technology 
was being studied as a process for bonding corrosion- 
resistant coatings on metals. Unlike conventional 
electroplating, spray casting does not generate waste. The 
plasma centrifugal furnance was being studied for the 
disposal of smoke and flare devices as well as classified 
electronic circuits. The plasma furance may be a non-
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polluting method of disposal.
On September 22, 1993 Representative Pat Williams noted 
that the House of Representatives' Committee of 
Appropriations approved $9.3 million for the two CDIF 
projects. The House panel increased its funding for spray 
casting research, an Air Force project, from its present 
$1.1 million to $5 million for fiscal year 1994. The House 
panel also increased funding for plasma centrifugal furnance 
research, an Army project, from its current $594,000 to $6
million for fiscal year 1994.^^
On October 4, 1993 Senators Baucus and Burns reported
that $11 million had been earmarked for the two CDIF
projects. This was $1.7 million more than the initial House 
panel budget. In a congressional joint meeting, however, 
the House members agreed to the $1.7 million additional 
funding.
The budget crisis that began in April 1993 was now 
partially solved. In response to the $11 million Department 
of Defense allocation. Senator Burns commented that "[t]his 
funding means saving 40 to 50 jobs in Butte and continuing 
research in advanced environmental technology in Montana.
Don Peoples commended the Montana delegation for pushing the 
funding. However, Peoples noted that MTC may still have to 
terminate 40 to 50 workers if more funding was not found.
On September 30, 1993 the MHD Program at the CDIF was 
officially concluded.^® Over the next few months
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approximately 50 workers were laid off.^® During its 17- 
year history, the MHD program contributed $2 4 0 million to 
the State and local economy by providing jobs and attracting 
a highly trained and educated workforce of engineers, 
professionals, and skilled technicians. Of the 300 
employees MTC Butte employees, at least 2 00 are highly 
trained. According to Don Peoples, Butte now has the 
highest concentration of such experts in the state.
Montana Technology Companies' New Market
In March 1994 a 15-member team from the Department of 
Energy visited the CDIF site. Senator Baucus had requested 
that DOE undertake a fact-finding mission to determine 
whether the CDIF could be transferred from the DOE's Fossil 
Energy Division to another d i v i s i o n . D o n  Peoples noted 
that if a transfer does occur, "[m]ost likely it will be 
environmental management. Senator Baucus commented that 
"I am confident that this facility is one of the Department 
of Energy's best in the country —  both in terms of the 
facility and the first rate staff —  and this review will 
confirm that.
On April 7, 1994 Baucus' prediction came true. Thomas 
Crumbly, assistant secretary of the Department of Energy, 
announced that the Department had decided to place the CDIF 
site under the Environmental Restoration division, its 
environmental management office. Crumbly said he expected
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the number of projects at CDIF to double under the 
environmental management division. The DOE has 135 sites in 
28 states that need cleanup and Butte will be at the center 
of those efforts.
Given that the CDIF had a new role, its annual $2 5 
million to $29 million budget was expected to remain the 
same or grow. Don Peoples stated that "[i]t really does 
give us a sense of security.Regarding CDIF's new role 
Secretary Crumbly noted that "[w]hile we are not going to 
bring nuclear wastes here, we are going to bring the future. 
And that future is environmental technology."'*^
The Department of Energy changed CDIF's mission from 
finding ways of burning coal more cleanly to cleaning up 
pollution. Toward this end, CDIF was renamed the Western 
Environmental Technology Office (WETO) in A p r i l . M e l  
Shupe, the new manager of DOE's WETO, stated that he would 
like to see MSE and WETO "work in a partnership basis to 
bring renewed focus on environmental technology."'*^
On April 13, 1994 Montana Technology Companies received 
notice that the Department of Energy would retain MTC's 
subsidiary, MSE, as contractor of the former CDIF site, 
which was now WETO. Senator Baucus noted that MSE was given 
a contract worth $15.7 million that would run through 
September 30, 1994. MSE was also given a second contract 
worth $23.6 million that would run from October 1, 1994 
through September 30, 1995.^° Senator Baucus stated that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
"[n]ot only does this contract extension support the 
environmental technology being developed at CDIF, but it 
will help cement the security of the over 240 jobs.”^̂
On May 11, 1994 Senate Bill 978, which was sponsored by 
Senator Baucus, passed the U.S. Senate by a margin of 85 to 
14.^2 Baucus' bill, called the National Environmental 
Technology Act, contained five key components. First, the 
federal government will develop a national strategy for 
environmental technology and coordinate agency spending on 
environmental technologies. Second, some-funds now targeted 
for environmental cleanup will instead be allocated on 
research and development of new technologies. Third, the 
EPA will create a new office to help develop new 
technologies that have insufficient funding. Fourth, an 
outreach program will help small businesses find cleanup 
technologies that match their needs. Finally, EPA will 
voluntarily verify whether a new technology meets EPA 
standards.
Don Peoples stated that the act would benefit MTC in 
several ways. MTC experienced difficulty getting money for 
research since numerous federal agencies had environmental 
cleanup divisions. These funding sources will now all be 
coordinated through the EPA, which should make getting funds 
easier.However, the National Environmental Technology 
Act would not only benefit MTC. The Act would also benefit 
the 200 environmental technology companies in Montana.
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These 200 companies employ over 1,000 people.
In July MTC's subsidiary, MSE, won a $3.5 million 
contract to remove storage tanks throughout Montana. MSE 
outbid 10 or 11 larger companies from Montana and elsewhere 
for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' contract. Previously, 
MSE had won large government contracts for investigating 
methods of cleaning up hazardous wastes generated by hard 
rock mining. Now MSE was diversifying into other 
environmental service areas. Under this two year contract, 
MSE would investigate and remove from federal property about 
100 out-of-service storage tanks ranging in size from 500 to 
50,000 gallons.^®
On September 27, 1994, two days prior to MTC's fiscal 
year 199 5, Dr. Clyde Frank, deputy assistant secretary of 
the Department of Energy's Office of Technology Development, 
held a press conference at the WETO site. Secretary Frank 
described WETO's role as a centralized source of information 
on environmental research. He also stated that the public 
would see MTC's subsidiary, MSE, move to an international 
focus. An Ukranian technology was currently being tested by 
MSE at WETO. If successful, the technology would clean up 
large land masses.
In making the transition from fossil energy to 
environmental management, Don Peoples commented that MSE is 
"delighted to be able to accept the challenge...."^® The 
Mining City has gone from heavy industrial to remedial
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investigation and high-tech research, according to Jack 
Lynch, Butte's Chief Executive. As Lynch noted, "Butte's a 
town in transition.
Summary
This chapter reviewed the public-private partnership 
between Butte and Montana Technology Companies (MTC). 
Initially, the Montana Energy Research and Development 
Institute (MERDI) operated the DOE's Component Development 
and Integration Facility (CDIF) until 1980. Mountain States 
Energy (MSE), then-MERDI's for-profit arm, assumed 
management responsibility of CDIF from MERDI. In 1989 MERDI 
created a new for-profit organization, Montana Technology 
Companies (MTC). MERDI transferred MSE's stock to Montana 
Technology Companies (MTC) in exchange for 100 percent of 
the outstanding stock of MTC.
Montana Technology Companies operated the CDIF site and 
managed the Magnetohydrodynamics Program until September 30,
1993, when the program was terminated. During 1993 and
1994, Montana's congressional delegation convinced the 
Department of Energy to transfer the CDIF site from its 
fossil fuels division to its environmental restoration 
division. The Component Development and Integration 
Facility (CDIF) was renamed the Western Environmental 
Technology Office (WETO) in April 1994. Moreover, with the 
assistance of Montana's congressional delegation, Montana
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Technology Companies received funding from several new 
sources during 1993 and 1994.
These new funding sources included the following: (1)
the Environmental Protection Agency, which funds the 
National Mine Waste Program, (2) the Department of Defense, 
which funds the National Environmental Waste Technology and 
Testing Center (NEWTTEC), (3) NASA, which funds the
hypersonic wind tunnel project, (4) the Air Force, which 
funds spray casting research, (5) the Army, which funds 
classified waste disposal, and (6) the Army Corp of 
Engineers, which funds removal of out-of-service tanks. As
a result of these new funding sources, Montana Technology 
Companies was able to make the transition from a fossil 
energy management company to an environmental technology 
management company. In the process, Montana Technology 
Companies was able to maintain the job base of nearly 300 
highly skilled employees in Butte.
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IV. THE ANACONDA-ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY PARTNERSHIP
This chapter reviews the public-private partnership 
between Anaconda and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). It 
provides an overview of the Atlantic Richfield Company. The 
chapter also sets the context for the public-private 
partnership with a discussion of Superfund. Finally, the 
chapter focuses on only one of ARCO's partnerships; the 
creation of the Jack Nicklaus golf course.
The Atlantic Richfield Comoanv
In 1977 the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) purchased 
the Anaconda Company. ARCO's purchase of the Company 
created great expectations among Montanans. Michael 
Malone's commentary, "The Close Of The Copper Century," 
captures Montanans' view:
It would surely be only a matter of time until 
some conglomerate bought the depreciated Anaconda; and 
after a series of scares, many Montanans breathed a 
sigh of relief when the reputedly public-spirited ARCO 
bought the company in 1977 and made it into its 
Anaconda Minerals Division. They breathed too soon, 
for despite its promises to the contrary, ARCO soon 
began closing down the aging Anaconda facilities in 
Montana.̂
The Atlantic Richfield Company does have a reputation 
for being public-spirited. ARCO was an industry leader 
before it became fashionable among corporations to 
demonstrate their commitment to "the environment." In 1989 
ARCO introduced reformulated regular gasoline (EC-1), which
48
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set it apart from other oil companies. ARCO utilized barges 
for the first-ever back haul of reusable scrap metal from 
Alaska's North Slope. ARCO's gift of 572 acres of 
environmentally-sensitive desert land to The Nature 
Conservancy prompted Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan 
to describe the donation as "the kind of creative public- 
private partnership that will make the preservation of our 
nation's wildlands possible.
By 1989 the Atlantic Richfield Company was one of the 
largest integrated petroleum companies in the industry with 
world-wide sales of over $16 billion and earnings of $1.9 
billion. ARCO subsidiaries included oil and gas 
exploration, production, refining, transportation, and 
marketing. Along with the oil and gas businesses the 
chemical, plastics, and coal operations constituted the core 
of ARCO's businesses.^
Superfund
In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), which is commonly referred to as Superfund. The 
Superfund provides for the creation of a fund, which is 
financed through taxes on chemicals, feedstocks, motor 
fuels, and other products that contain hazardous substances. 
Congress significantly amended the act in 1986.^
Superfund, which is administered by ERA, gives the
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federal government a mandate to deal with hazardous wastes 
that have been spilled, stored, or abandoned. Superfund 
requires the EPA to identify hazardous waste sites and rank 
these sites based on the severity of their risk. Today 
there are more than 2 5,000 sites.^
The EPA places the sites with the highest ranking on a 
National Priority List. Before cleanup can begin, EPA 
conducts studies to determine the best method for cleaning 
the site. To prevent fire, explosion, contamination of 
drinking water, or other imminent danger, the EPA can 
quickly authorize cleanup at either hazardous priority or 
nonpriority sites.® In ranking sites EPA considers five 
exposure pathways: (1) the population put at risk, (2) the
hazard potential of substances, (3) the potential for 
contamination of drinking water, (4) the possibility of 
direct human contact, and (5) the potential for destruction 
of sensitive ecosystems. Superfund gives the EPA broad 
discretion in determining the appropriate remedial action to 
be taken in a specific instance.^
Superfund imposes liability on responsible parties for 
the costs of removal or remedial action, costs of response 
by other parties or entities, and for damage to, or 
destruction of, natural resources. The EPA can order a 
responsible party to clean up a hazardous waste site. If 
the responsible party fails to cleanup a site, the EPA can 
clean the site and recover the cleanup costs from the
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responsible party.®
The Superfund imposes strict liability, which is 
liability without fault or negligence. The liability is 
also joint or several. That is, a single party may be held 
responsible for all cleanup costs even if other parties are 
involved. Joint or several liability might occur when other 
parties have disappeared or become insolvent, defunct, or 
bankrupt. In short, a person or entity who is responsible 
for only a fraction of the hazardous waste may be liable for 
all the cleanup costs.^
Under Superfund law, the government can hold any party 
found to have contributed to a waste site responsible for 
100 percent of the cost. The responsible party then tracks 
down and sues other companies that may have contributed to 
the waste site. The result is that no one wants to acquire 
a designated Superfund site for fear of being held liable. 
This current process prohibits a market for the transfer of 
sites.
There are nearly 1,200 sites on the government's 
priority cleanup list. To date, fewer than 150 projects 
have been completed and dozens of new sites are added to the 
list each year. A Rand Corporation study on how 108 
companies spend money at 18 toxic sites concluded that over 
a decade about 32 percent was spent on legal fees or other 
activities not related to cleanup.
Following her tour of Anaconda on October 16, 1993,
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Carol Browner, director of the EPA, stressed that liability 
is the key to pressuring the responsibile party to pay for 
cleaning up sites. However, Browner stated that ’’doesn't 
mean we shouldn't make some changes in how we pay for 
c l e a n u p . S e n a t o r  Max Baucus, chair of the Superfund. 
Recycling, and Solid Waste Committee, agreed with Director 
Browner that Superfund needs to shift resources from legal 
battles to actually cleaning sites.
EPA is looking for a way to return reclaimed sites to 
communities. Browner said EPA is looking at changes to the 
law, which is scheduled for reauthorization in late 1994, 
that will give local communities a greater role. Browner 
agreed that the cleanup beginning at the Old Works site 
involves the very issues of economic development and 
community involvement that are soon to become part of the 
national d e b a t e . A s  Browner noted, "[n]ow we need a 
mechanism to say to the communities, okay it's done, now you 
can get back and develop and get on with it.
According to Anaconda resident Milo Manning, "[t]he key 
is getting community involvement."^^ William Menahan, a 
state representative, said that Deer Lodge County was being 
punished for this site. Menahan stated that "[e]ven though 
we're getting some development, businesses can't invest 
because they're afraid of becoming a PRP (potentially 
responsible party).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
The Partnership Evolution
The Atlantic Richfield Company plans to transfer 1,500 
acres of Superfund land along with a proposed 500 acre, 
golf-course to Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. The transfer 
would include the proposed Nicklaus golf course site, the 
hillside ruins of the Old Works smelters, the red 
sands/Arbiter area, the east Anaconda yards at the foot of 
smelter hill, and the former Mill Creek townsite.^^
Under the proposed contract ARCO would transfer the 
property to the county before the cleanup.and course 
construction begins. Once all the work is done, Anconda- 
Deer Lodge would be responsible for insuring that the 
reclamation stays in place. According to Sandy Stash,
ARCO's Superfund manager, the idea is that the county will 
eventually be able to open the former Superfund land to 
development.
Charlie Coleman, EPA project manager for the site, 
stated that EPA welcomes cleanup with an eye to future 
economic development. However, Coleman cautioned that the 
county should make provisions for a contingency fund in 
negotiating the land transfer. If the county takes on this 
responsibility, there could be hidden costs assigned to 
t h e m . C o l e m a n  stated that "[w]e just want to be sure if 
the county takes on the responsibility, that they are 
adequately funded.
The EPA will play a minimal role in the negotiations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
between ARCO and Anaconda over how the development is 
operated. But because the course and most other lands now 
under discussion fall under the Superfund law, EPA must sign 
off on the final agreement. IF ARCO incorporates some 
aspect of the County performing work and the County is not 
adequately qualified, then EPA will not approve the 
design.
On October 26, 199 3 negotiations began between ARCO and 
Anaconda-Deer Lodge County on the transfer of the proposed 
Jack Nicklaus Superfund golf course. ARCO wanted the 
negotiations to come to a close by January or February 1994. 
This meant that ARCO would need to reach a final agreement 
with Anaconda-Deer Lodge County and the EPA would have to 
sign off in a "record of decision." Moreover, EPA would 
need to produce a separate document which would protect the 
county from Superfund liability.
Although the transfer contract was nearly 70 pages, the 
following eight points highlighted ARCO's initial position. 
First, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County will take title to the 
property before the course is built, granting ARCO right 
access to build the golf course, move material, and perform 
other cleanup work. Second, the county will become a 
potentially responsible party (PRP). However, EPA will 
offer protection in the form of a prospective purchaser 
agreement. Third, ARCO will pay for some basic equipment 
for the course but expects the county to finance the
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Clubhouse, pay start-up costs, and provide management before 
any revenues are generated. Fourth, the county must make 
monthly or quarterly reports on the sites to ARCO and the 
EPA. Fifth, the county will have unspecified obligations to 
the Jack Nicklaus company. Sixth, ARCO will reserve the 
right to audit the books and review management records. 
Seventh, the country will agree not to sue ARCO and ARCO 
will agree not to sue the county. Finally, the county will 
also take title to the Old Works trail system, the ball 
fields/industrial park, the red sands and Arbiter plant, the 
east Anaconda yards, the drag strip, and the former Mill 
Creek townsite.^^
Anaconda-Deer Lodge County commissioners expressed 
several concerns regarding the initial ARCO proposal. Pete 
Smith was skeptical about taking title to the land before 
ARCO performed the cleanup since the county would become a 
potentially responsible party (PRP). ARCO wanted the county 
to become a potentially responsible party should the county 
create new problems. The county would be held responsible 
only to ensure that the remedy remained in place. The EPA 
would exempt the county from any past waste problems.
Cheryl Beatty, Anaconda's Chief Executive, asked 
whether ARCO planned to establish a trust fund to cover 
unexpected costs. Beatty had promised the taxpayers that no 
local tax dollars would be spent in the transfer of 
Superfund sites to Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. ARCO
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responded that it was looking at a fund for maintenance of 
the non-golf property. other issues called for the creation 
of a Golf Course Authority, which would serve as a board of 
directors, apply for non-profit tax status, and interview 
management companies to operate the course.
On November 8 Bill Lamont, an ARCO consultant, provided 
the Golf Course Authority with a list of eleven companies 
that expressed an interest in managing the course. Sandy 
Stash, ARCO's Superfund manager, stressed the importance of 
having a representative of the management company on site as 
construction begins in June 1994. ARCO wanted a final 
decision about the management company by February 4, 1994. 
Authority members thought that this timetable was too 
aggressive.^® According to Stash, the reason for this 
aggressive schedule was due to ARCO's goals: "Our goal is to 
take care of our environmental commitment and get back to 
the business of producing oil and gas. And we don't produce 
oil and gas in Anaconda, Montana.
On November 11 County Attorney Ed Beaudette told the 
county commissioners that while county tax dollars would not 
be used to fund the land, the county attorney, planning 
department, and county staff would need to participate in 
the process. The Golf Course Authority running the 
operation is an arm of the county.Beaudette stated that 
"I have a responsibility to work on the Golf Course 
Authority at every level to see the people who elected you
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and elected me are protected.
On November 29 and 30, ARCO ran two full-page, public
relations advertisements in The Montana Standard. The
advertisements were part of ARCO’s "A Perspective On Shared
Duties." The November 29 advertisement began with the
question; "How Much Was ’The Richest Hill On Earth’ Worth To
Montana? ARCO responded to the question, in part, with
these statements ;
Government had a part in mining’s growth. Mining could 
never have prospered as it did without the help of the 
U.S. Government. Mining’s role in the development of 
our country was established when the Mining Law of 1866 
opened up public lands from coast to coast for mining 
exploration and development. Since the turn of the 
century, the State of Montana also encouraged the 
growth of mining by excluding it from environmental 
controls often placed on other industries of the day.
In fact, lawmakers of that time even expanded the 
state’s power of eminent domain to the mining industry. 
This allowed mining companies to build dumps, ditches, 
roads and working mines on public and private lands..,.
Teaming up with government. Now it's time to find 
solutions to the problems created by more than 100 
years of mining and smelting in Montana. ARCO, because 
it purchased the holdings of The Anaconda Company in 
1977, is involved in a massive Superfund effort. Over 
the past several years, ARCO has committed more than 
$140 million to cleaning up the remnants of our mining 
history. We're making significant progress. And we
plan to fulfill our obligations  Since all of
us —  communities, industry and the state —  supported 
and benefitted from the economic growth provided by 
mining, we all should work together to find these 
reasonable solutions. As partners, we can insure that 
our children have a clean, healthy place to live.
The November 3 0 advertisement began with the question:
"Where Does Cleanup End And Innovation Begin?" ARCO
responded to the question, in part, with these statements:
Let's leave behind lasting values. since beginning
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work on the Clark Fork River Basin in the mid-1980s, 
it's been ARCO's desire to be creative with cleanup 
plans —  to do more than simply make an affected area 
safe. Wherever feasible, we join with communities in 
looking for solutions that enhance the natural beauty 
and economic stability of an area.
The site of the Old Works in Anaconda is an excellent 
example. To prevent the site's smelting waste from 
threatening human health or the environment, it will be 
cleaned up according to Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and State of Montana standards. In addition. 
Anaconda's Old Works golf course is expected to be 
built at the site. It is scheduled to open in the 
spring of 1996 and begin attracting about 40,000 
golfers a year. The course, designed by Jack Nicklaus, 
will blend with the area's natural environment —  wild 
grasslands will grow between the lush fairways which 
wrap along the bordering hillside and Warm Springs 
Creek. Also, an Historic Trail highlighting Anaconda's 
smelting heritage will skirt the hills, providing 
walkers with a good view of the course. ARCO is proud 
to be partners with Anaconda/Deer Lodge County local 
government and the community of Anaconda in making this 
project happen.
On December 1 ARCO met with the Golf Course Authority 
(GCA). ARCO's position at the meeting was twofold. First, 
ARCO linked the gold course site of 500 acres to the other 
Superfund sites of 1,500 acres. Second, before ARCO would 
pass title of the golf course to Anaconda-Deer Lodge, the 
county roust finance and construct a clubhouse, demonstrate 
financial backing, and provide a business p l a n . I n  
response to these positions, Ed Blume, a GCA board member, 
stated "[t]he thing of it is this 'either you do it or we'll 
fence it' has got to change. Nobody can threaten us and 
tell us what we've got to d o . C h e r y l  Beatty, Anaconda 
CEO, noted that parts of the transfer document remain 
sketchy. The county does not yet know what obligations
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
accompany the operations of the golf course and what reports 
EPA and ARCO will require.^'*
One week after the December 1 negotiations, ARCO ran 
the same two-page, public relations advertisements in The 
Montana Standard on December 6 and December 8 that it had 
run on November 2 9 and November 30. On December 8 The 
Montana Standard lead story and headlines read: Coalition 
criticizes ARCO ads. The Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition, 
an environmental organization, asked ARCO to stop its 
"misleading" advertising campaign, which claims the state of 
Montana is partly to blame for the contamination caused by 
m i n i n g . I n  a letter to Bill Williams, ARCO's Montana 
Operations Manager, C.B. Phearson, an officer of the 
environmental coalition, wrote this statement: "It is 
shameful for ARCO to mislead Montanans by attempting to pass 
along your cleanup responsibility and liability to 
government and its c i t i z e n s . S u z a n n e  Lagoni, ARCO's 
Public Affairs Mananager, responded that "[w ]e have a 
message. We're proud of what we're doing and that's the 
purpose of advertising."^^ ARCO said the advertisements 
were not misleading and planned to continue the 
advertising.
On December 9, ARCO faced another public relations 
challenge. A report issued by the state of Montana's 
Natural Resource Damage Program estimated the environmental 
damage in the upper Clark Fork River Basin at between $265
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million to $297 m i l l i o n . O n  December 10, Bill Williams, 
ARCO's Montana Operations Manager, responded: "The state's 
$265-million natural resources damages claim against ARCO is 
overblown and based on a faulty economic formula that 
unrealistically assesses the value of polluted areas.... 
We're not even in the same ball park.
Two days later ARCO representatives and their lawyers 
met with all parties from EPA, the state of Montana's 
Department of Health and Environmental Science, and 
Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. Several observations came from 
this meeting. For ARCO the partnership provides a mechanism 
for its clean-up obligations and exit strategy from 
Anaconda. For EPA the partnership establishes a stable 
entity, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, to maintain 
"institutional controls," which include county permits 
regarding how the land can be developed. For Anaconda-Deer 
Lodge County the partnership means revenue in the short-term 
from the proposed golf course and in the long-term from the 
1,500 acres of developable land.
Although ARCO will build the golf course, the county is 
responsible for building and financing the clubhouse. 
According to Bill Finnegan, president of the Golf Course 
Authority, financing would be next to impossible without 
pledging collateral. Under ARCO's current proposal, none of 
the property can be used as collateral for loans.
A related issue was the operations and maintenance
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costs of the 1,500 acres that are not part of the golf 
course. Andy Lensink, an attorney from EPA's regional 
Denver office, commented that the complex cleanup-transfer 
agreement between ARCO and Anaconda-Deer Lodge County is 
innovative. However, Lensink noted that EPA will hold 
Anaconda's local government legally responsible for the 
operations and maintenance costs established in the final 
agreement. Superfund is enforced by the U.S. Justice 
Department "in perpetuity," which means the county will be 
signing on forever.
During February Bill Finnegan put together an 
innovative financial package. Revenue bonds could be used 
to finance the full $500,000 needed for the clubhouse 
building. These revenue bonds could be sold to investors in 
increments of $50,000. The interest would be paid from 
revenues generated from golf course operations. Local 
investors could support the project by buying bonds.
Smaller local investors could participate by banding 
together to buy the bonds. However, actually issuing and 
selling the bonds would take several months, well beyond 
ARCO's March 31 deadline. As an interim solution, the Golf 
Authority will borrow $100,000 for a modular building.
On March 3 Sandy Stash, ARCO's Montana facilities 
manager, pushed the deadline from March 31 to April 15 for 
the land transfer. However, she noted that April 15 was the 
absolute deadline since groundbreaking for the golf course
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was scheduled on May 1. If the deal was not signed by April 
15, then ground-breaking would be postponed until 1995.^®
On March 9, Bill Yellowtail, EPA regional 
administrator, and Robert Robinson, director of the state 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, signed the 
EPA "Record of Decision." This decision set a precedent for 
the EPA by incorporating the local government as an 
"institutional control" and allowing a luxury golf course as 
a cap over mine tailings and other wastes. It was the first 
time the state environmental agency signed off on an EPA 
Super fund cleanup order in Montana. Charlie Coleman,
EPA's project manager for the Old Works site, made these 
comments; "I think what makes this really different is the 
county's willingness to take a stake in their own future and 
take some of the responsiblity. I think that risk will pay 
off in the future.
On April 15 the Justice Department and the EPA signed a 
"prospective purchaser agreement," which Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County and the Golf Course Authority had previously signed. 
Senator Max Baucus and Representative Pat Williams announced 
the Justice Department had cleared this agreement, which 
will protect Anaconda-Deer Lodge County from Superfund 
liability in the Jack Nicklaus golf course project.'^® As 
Senator Baucus noted, "[1]ast month I wrote the Justice 
Department asking that they put approval of this agreement 
on a fast track. I'm delighted to say they've come through.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
And that is very good news for Anaconda and the surrounding 
area.
On May 5 Anaconda-Deer Lodge County and ARCO signed
about 100 pounds of documents which included 70 signature
pages. When the signing was completed, Anaconda-Deer Lodge
County became the owner of 2,000 acres of Superfund property
and heir to a Jack Nicklaus-designed golf c o u r s e . C h e r y l
Beatty, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County CEO, commented that
"[t]his is truly a great day for A n a c o n d a . C h a r l i e
Coleman, EPA's project manager, stated that "[t]he whole
idea of turning Superfund land back to the community is
gaining interest n a t i o n w i d e . I n  his letter of
congratulations Senator Baucus wrote that "[w]orking with
ARCO, EPA, and the Department of Justice, you made it
happen. You reached an agreement that serves as a national
example of how the Superfund project should work.
News of the story spread quickly across the state. On
Sunday, May 8, The Great Falls Tribune published an
extensive article in its "Marketplace" section. The
headline was Anaconda charts post-industrial course. The
first, three sentences read;
In 1980 the last vestiges of copper smelting here were 
closed, leaving behind a giant smokestack, thousands of 
workers and a century's worth of hazardous waste. But 
this company town without a company is not looking at 
mining or smelting to breathe life back into its 
languishing economy. It's looking at golf.
The article concluded with a statement by the executive
director of Montana Trout Unlimited, Bruce Farling. Farling
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noted that ”[i]t's sleight of hand. They [ARCO] don't have 
to do soil removal, they cap it. They don't have worry 
[sic] about cleaning groundwater. It's absurd.
On May 26 the Golden Bear, Jack Nicklaus, visited the 
Smelter City, Anaconda, for the ground breaking. Jack 
Nicklaus said he could see this was not going to be an 
ordinary, golf course ground breaking. This was a community 
event in which elementary school kids provided a gauntlet to 
the ground breaking area. At a press conference at the 
Old Works site, Nicklaus was asked about jeopardizing his 
reputation by associating with a Superfund site. Nicklaus 
offered this response:
If I'm risking my reputation by being here, I 
don't mind risking it every day. People will be coming 
from all over looking at it. Some people will say I 
lost my marbles... but I think when we're done, you'll 
be very proud of it and I'll be very proud of it.
Summary
This chapter reviewed the public-private partnership 
between Anaconda and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). It 
provided an overview of the Atlantic Richfield Company. The 
chapter also presented the context of the public-private 
partnership. Superfund gave the federal government a 
mandate to deal with hazardous wastes. Superfund imposed 
liability on responsible parties for the costs of removal 
and remedial action.
The chapter focused on one of ARCO's partnerships: the
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creation of the Jack Nicklaus golf course. The Atlantic 
Richfield Company wanted to transfer 2,000 acres of 
Superfund sites to Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. To make the 
transfer more appealing, ARCO offered to design and build a 
Jack Nicklaus golf course. However, the county would become 
responsible for operating the golf course. Moreover, the 
county would become legally liable for maintaining the 
reclamation process on the 1,500 acres once ARCO brought 
these acres into compliance with EPA standards.
To complete the transfer process, a number of parties 
became involved. Besides parties from Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County and ARCO, other parties included EPA national and 
regional representatives, the state of Montana's Department 
of Health and Environmental Sciences, Montana's 
congressional delegation, the Justice Department, and the 
Jack Nicklaus' golf company. The outcome was a national, 
precedent-setting transfer: Anaconda-Deer Lodge County 
became the owner of 2,000 acres of Superfund property and 
heir to a Jack Nicklaus-designed golf course.
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Âtlantic Richfield Company Annual Report. 1989.
^Henry Cheeseman, Contemporary Business Law (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994), p. 761.
^Ibid.. p. 764.
^Ibid.. p. 764.
^Rogene Buchholz, Principles Of Environmental 
Management: The Greening Of Business (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 294.
®Ibid.. p. 294.
^Ibid.. p. 294.
lÛThe Montana Standard. 5 November 1993.
^^The Montana Standard. 17 October 1993 .
^^The Montana Standard. 17 October 1993 .
^^The Montana Standard. 17 October 1993 .
^^The Montana Standard. 17 October 1993 .
l^The Montana Standard. 17 October 1993 .
^®The Montana Standard. 17 October 1993 .
■̂̂ The Montana Standard. 5 October 1993 .
^®The Montana Standard. 5 October 1993.
^^The Montana Standard. 5 October 1993 .
2°The Montana Standard. 5 October 1993 .
2^The Montana Standard. 5 October 1993 .
22The Montana Standard. 27 October 1993 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
^‘̂The
riWJi uaiid
Montana
o uajiuax. u /
standard.
6 / 
27 October 1993.
2®The Montana Standard. 27 October 1993.
26The Montana Standard. 9 November 1993 .
2”̂The Montana Standard. 12 November 1993.
2® The Montana Standard. 1 2 November 1993 .
2®The Montana Standard. 1 2 November 1993 .
®°The Montana Standard. 29 November 1993 .
3iThe Montana Standard. 30 November 1993 .
32The Montana Standard. 2 December 1993 .
®®The Montana Standard. 2 December 1993.
®^The Montana Standard. 2 December 1993 .
®®The Montana Standard. 8 December 1993.
®®The Montana Standard. 8 December 1993 .
®^The Montana Standard. 8 December 1993 .
3®The Montana Standard. 8 December 1993 .
®®The Montana Standard. 1 0 December 1993 .
detailed assessment of Atlantic Richfield Company's 
obligations, see State Of Montana, Natural Resource Damage 
Program, Restoration Report: Upper Clark Fork River NFL 
Sites. March 1994.
40The Montana Standard. 10 December 1993.
^^The Montana Standard. 13 December 1993.
42The Montana Standard. 13 December 1993.
^®The Montana Standard. 26 January 1994.
"̂ T̂he Montana Standard. 4 March 1994.
^®The Montana Standard. 4 March 1994.
^®The Montana Standard. 10 May 1994.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
^’The Montana Standard. 10
^®The Montana Standard, 16
'̂ T̂he Montana Standard, 16
SOThe Montana Standard. 6
®^The Montana Standard. 6
52The Montana Standard, 6
^^The Montana Standard. 6
®^The Great Falls Tribune-
^^The Great Falls Tribune.
sÔThe Montana Standard. 27
■̂̂ The Montana Standard. 27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V. CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the material from the first 
four chapters. Moreover, this chapter examines 
observations, limitations, and conclusions of the thesis 
project.
Summarv
Chapter 1, Introduction, provided an historical sketch 
of the beginning, evolution, and decline of the Butte- 
Anaconda area from 1865 to 1985. The chapter also provided 
an overview of the thesis. The objective of the thesis was 
to investigate this research question: What roles have 
public-private partnerships played in Butte-Anaconda's 
economic development?
Chapter 2, The Theory Of Public-Private Partnerships, 
reviewed different partnership models. Several disciplines 
such as public administration, economic development, and 
organization theory provided the bases for these models.
This chapter offered six perspectives from which to view 
public-private partnerships. The market failure perspective 
viewed the public sector as a remedy for the private 
sector's shortcomings. These shortcomings or failures arose 
from two sources: externalities and increasing returns. The 
Perry and Rainey perspective distinguished public 
organizations from private organizations. This perspective
69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
classified organizations based on ownership, funding, and 
mode of social control. The Savas perspective developed 
another classification scheme for public and private 
organizations. This perspective used the inherent 
characteristics of goods and services to determine whether 
public or private organizations were the best suppliers.
This perspective classified public and private organizations 
based on ownership, management, and operation.
The Osborne and Gaebler perspective drew from the work 
of the Savas perspective- Osborne and Gaebler assigned 
various tasks to three sectors: public, private, and third. 
The tasks were "weighted” based on their degree of 
effectiveness. The Smilor, Gibson, and Kozmetsky 
perspective identified eight partners for creating a 
"technopolis." Their perspective derived from observations 
of the emerging technopolis of Austin, Texas. Finally, the 
Waddock perspective provided insight to creating public- 
private partnerships. This perspective described the 
various linking mechanisms necessary for initiating and 
maintaining partnerships.
Chapter 3, The Butte-Montana Technology Companies 
Partnership, described key community and corporate players 
responsible for creating a regional environmental technology 
center. The key players included the U.S. Department of 
Energy, Montana's congressional delegation, and Montana 
Technology Companies.
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This chapter reviewed the public-private partnership 
between Butte and Montana Technology Companies (MTC). 
Initially, the Montana Energy Research and Development 
Institute (MERDI) operated the DOE's Component Development 
and Integration Facility (CDIF) until 1980. Mountain States 
Energy (MSE), then-MERDI's for-profit arm, assumed 
management responsibility of CDIF from MERDI. In 1989 MERDI 
created a new for-profit organization, Montana Technology 
Companies (MTC). MERDI transferred MSE's stock to Montana 
Technology Companies (MTC) in exchange for ICO percent of 
the outstanding stock of MTC.
Montana Technology Companies operated the CDIF site and 
managed the Magnetohydrodynamics Program until September 30,
1993, when the program was terminated. During 1993 and
1994, Montana's congressional delegation convinced the 
Department of Energy to transfer the CDIF site from its 
fossil fuels division to its environmental restoration 
division. The Component Development and Integration 
Facility (CDIF) was renamed the Western Environmental 
Technology Office (WETO) in April 1994. Moreover, with the 
assistance of Montana's congressional delegation, Montana 
Technology Companies received funding from several new 
sources during 1993 and 1994.
These new funding sources included the following; (1) 
the Environmental Protection Agency, which funds the 
National Mine Waste Program, (2) the Department of Defense,
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Which funds the National Environmental Waste Technology and 
Testing Center (NEWTTEC), (3) NASA, which funds the
hypersonic wind tunnel project, (4) the Air Force, which 
funds spray casting research, (5) the Army, which funds 
classified waste disposal, and (6) the Army Corp of 
Engineers, which funds removal of out-of-service tanks. As 
a result of these new funding sources, Montana Technology 
Companies was able to make the transition from a fossil 
energy management company to an environmental technology 
management company. In the process, Montana Technology 
Companies was able to maintain the job base of nearly 3 00 
highly skilled employees in Butte.
Chapter 4, The Anaconda-Atlantic Richfield Company 
Partnership, described key community and corporate players 
responsible for creating the first Superfund golf course. 
This chapter reviewed the public-private partnership between 
Anaconda and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). It provided 
an overview of the Atlantic Richfield Company.
The chapter also set the context for the public-private 
partnership with a discussion of Superfund. Superfund gave 
the federal government a mandate to deal with hazardous 
wastes. Superfund imposed liability on responsible parties 
for the costs of removal and remedial action.
Finally, the chapter focused on only one of ARCO's 
partnerships: the creation of the Jack Nicklaus golf course. 
The Atlantic Richfield Company wanted to transfer 2,000
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acres of Superfund sites to Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. To 
make the transfer more appealing, ARCO offered to design and 
build a Jack Nicklaus golf course. However, the county 
would become responsible for operating the golf course. 
Moreover, the county would become legally liable for 
maintaining the reclamation process on the 1,500 acres once 
ARCO brought these acres into compliance with EPA standards.
To complete the transfer process, a number of parties 
became involved. Besides parties from Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County and ARCO, other parties included EPA national and 
regional representatives, the state of Montana's Department 
of Health and Environmental Sciences, Montana's 
congressional delegation, the Justice Department, and Jack 
Nicklaus' golf company. The outcome was a national, 
precedent-setting transfer; Anaconda-Deer Lodge County 
became the owner of 2,000 acres of Superfund property and 
heir to a Jack Nicklaus-designed golf course.
Observations
Six perspectives were identified from which to view 
public-private partnerships. Each perspective provides a 
limited understanding of the two partnerships. From a 
market failures perspective, the partnership between Butte- 
Montana Technology Companies is the result, in part, of a 
market failure that began several decades ago. The Anaconda 
Copper Company produced negative externalities by polluting
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air, land, and water. With the assistance of federal and 
state governments, the Butte-MTC partnership provides a 
partial remedy for negative externalities.
From Perry and Rainey's perspective, one might classify 
Montana Technology Companies as (mostly) a "government 
contractor." MTC is privately owned by a non-profit, MERDI. 
MTC's primary funding source is public. However, MTC s mode 
of social control is a hybrid between market and polyarchic 
context.
Montana Technology Companies' mode of social control is 
"market" to a certain degree because there were no organized 
interests trying to influence its products. MTC is 
"polyarchic" to a certain degree because its funding sources 
relied on bargaining and persuasion of external groups. For 
example, Montana's congressional delegation probably had to 
"give" or promise other funding projects to different 
congressional committees and federal departments to secure 
funding for MTC. Using Savas' perspective, one might 
classify Montana Technology Companies as a "typical private 
system." MTC is privately owned; it is privately managed; 
it is privately operated.
From the technopolis perspective, one might identify 
several partners. Montana Technology Companies is an 
emerging company that was founded in 1989. It has several 
federal government partners, including EPA, DOE, and DOD.
It has a partnership with Montana Tech of the University of
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Montana. MTC funds graduate research projects as part of 
the Mine Waste Technology Pilot Program. MTC also has a 
number of support groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and 
the Butte Local Economic Development Corporation.
Using Waddock's perspective, one might identify Montana 
Technology Companies' connection to Butte as a broker and a 
common vision. Under the leadership of Don Peoples, former 
Butte CEO and now MTC's CEO, Peoples has managed an 
organization in transition from a fossil fuel-based company 
to an environmental technology-based company. Peoples has 
rallied both local and federal support around the imperative 
that Butte needs to diversify its economy.
One may also make a few observations about the second 
partnership, Anaconda-Atlantic Richfield Company. From a 
market failures perspective, the partnership between 
Anaconda-ARCO is the result, in part, of a market failure 
that began several decades ago. Since ARCO purchased the 
assets and liabilities of The Anaconda Copper Company in the 
1980s, ARCO also assumed the responsibility for the negative 
externalities produced by The Anaconda Copper Company. With 
the assistance of federal, state, and local governments, the 
Anaconda-ARCO partnership provides a partial remedy for 
negative externalities.
In contrast to Montana Technology Companies (MTC), 
classification of Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is more 
clearcut. From Perry and Rainey's perspective, one might
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classify ARCO as a "market." ARCO's ownership is private; 
its funding is private; its mode of social control is 
private. Using Savas' perspective, one might classify ARCO 
as a "typical private system." ARCO's ownership is private; 
its management is private; its operation is private.
From the technopolis perspective, one might identify 
several partners such as the EPA, the Justice Department, 
the state of Montana's Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences, and Montana's congressional 
delegation. However, the technopolis perspective is more 
applicable to a partnership setting that involves a 
technology-based company, either emerging or emerged, a 
research university, and federal agencies. The Anaconda- 
ARCO project involved the transfer of Superfund property 
using an innovative process, not the creation or the 
expansion of a new company.
Using Waddock's perspective, one might identify ARCO's 
connection to Anaconda as mandates, networks, and common 
vision. Superfund mandated interaction between ARCO, EPA, 
and Anaconda-Deer Lodge County. This mandated interaction 
created a network of relationships between otherwise 
unrelated organizations. The emerging network was a 
combination of business-professional, political, and 
community-civic ties. Finally, a common vision prompted the 
founding and growth of the network. ARCO wanted to transfer 
2,000 acres and Anaconda wanted to receive these 2,000
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acres. To facilitate the transfer and reception of the 
Superfund sites, the parties viewed a Jack Nicklaus golf 
course as a prime motivating factor.
In short, the six perspectives provide some insight 
into the two partnerships. The primary objective for 
highlighting the six perspectives was to indicate how social 
scientists view public-private partnerships. A secondary 
objective was to apply these perspectives to the two 
partnerships.
Limitations
The limitations of this thesis project are 
informational limitations. This project relies on 
government documents, corporate documents, and newspaper 
accounts. However, critical information flows are absent.
These critical information flows include an "insider's 
perspective." The ideal insider's perspective is a social 
scientist who is an employee of the organization(s) under 
study. The social scientist is able to gather data via 
surveys and observations in real time. For example, the 
author of this thesis project gained critical insight from 
being a member of a public-private partnership between 
Digital Equipment Corporation and the Southeast 
Manufacturing Technology Center in South Carolina. As a 
partnership member, the author was able to gather 
information in real time about the dynamics of the
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partnership. This insider's perspective gave the author 
invaluable insight that an outsider could not have 
perceived. In the context of this thesis project, the 
author's perspective misses critical information since the 
author was not present as real time decisions were 
addressed.
Conclusions
This thesis project addressed the research question: 
What roles have public-private partnerships played in Butte- 
Anaconda 's economic development? To answer this question, 
the thesis examined two public-private partnerships. The 
thesis gave a descriptive answer to a descriptive question.
The descriptive question and answer give rise to 
another question: What role should public-private 
partnerships play in the future economic development of the 
Butte-Anaconda area? This is a complex, prescriptive 
inquiry that merits both comprehensive and detailed answers, 
which are beyond the scope of this section. Moreover, the 
prescriptive question begs several questions regarding what 
constitutes economic development. For example, are "jobs" 
economic development? Are more manufacturing jobs than 
service jobs economic development? Are more "non­
polluting," manufacturing jobs than "polluting," 
manufacturing jobs economic development? If organizations 
yield greater productivity output with fewer labor inputs.
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then is the output economic development? As such, this 
section will not specifically address the initial 
prescriptive question raised at the beginning of this 
paragraph. Instead, this section will only sketch three 
considerations regarding economic development.
The first consideration is: Should Butte-Anaconda move 
away from a mining-smelting industry? The answer is "yes." 
Michael Malone and Richard Etulain write:
Clearly, this oldest of western industries has 
fallen for good. Low-cost southern-hemisphere mines 
command the markets of the world; Chilean miners earn 
only one-tenth of those in America; and flooded mines 
are in effect lost forever. The mining of precious and 
base metals will continue in the West and even surge, 
as it did in the late 1980s, but only on a reduced 
basis at places like Bingham Canyon or Butte and at 
smaller, shorter-term mines that use nonunion labor. 
Never again will metal mining buttress the economies of 
the entire subregions of the West as it did from 1850 
until 1980.^
The second consideration is: Toward what industry 
should Butte-Anaconda move? The answer is "environmental 
technology." Currently, the U.S. market for environmental 
technology is $80 billion. The global market for 
environmental technology is expected to more than double to 
$600 billion by the year 2000.  ̂ Senator Baucus believes 
that "Montana companies are on the cutting edge of the 
development of environmental technology"^
The third consideration is: What mixture of public- 
private partnerships should Butte-Anaconda employ? The 
answer is "diversification." Butte-Anaconda should not rely 
on a single, federal funding source. Moreover, Butte-
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Anaconda should avoid becoming a "company town."
If the Butte-Anaconda area wants to become an 
environmental technology center, then the area should let 
Roger Miller and Marcel Cote's observations about "Growing 
The Next Silicon Valley" serve as a guide. First, Miller 
and Cote note that while there are legitimate roles for 
government laboratories and universities, these 
organizations are poor incubators of entrepreneurs and high- 
tech products.̂  They state that "[p]roduct ideas generated 
in government laboratories and universities seldom meet 
marketplace standards, either technologically or in terms of 
cost."® Second, to support a high tech cluster. Miller and 
Cote identify four common characteristics: (1) several
research-oriented universities and laboratories which are 
recognized as leaders in their fields, (2) a tradition of 
contract research in these institutions, (3) a few large 
corporations with advanced laboratories in the region, and 
(4) close relationships between these research-oriented 
universities and local high-tech companies.®
The Butte-Montana TechnoIgy Companies partnership and 
the Anaconda-Atlantic Richfield Company partnership 
illustrate the complexities and dynamics of economic 
development. To state that "Butte-Anaconda's recovery stems 
from the market or private sector institutions" would be 
misleading. Butte-Anaconda*s recovery has included a mix of 
public-private partnerships.
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Butte was selected as one of the thirteen finalist
cities out of 300 that applied for the Micron Technology
site. Butte was selected as a finalist for several reasons,
including this reason:
A proven track record of economic development in the 
area since the demise of the Anaconda company. Butte 
is a dramatically different city than it was just 12 
years ago, thanks to strong public-private 
partnerships.’
Butte-Anaconda will continue its emphasis on public-private 
partnerships as an economic development strategy because 
these partnerships have contributed significantly to Butte- 
Anaconda 's recovery.
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